

CONFERENCE OF THE EIGHTEEN-NATION COMMITTEE
ON DISARMAMENT

ENDC/PV.167
18 February 1964
ENGLISH

FINAL VERBATIM RECORD OF THE ONE HUNDRED AND SIXTY-SEVENTH MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva
on Tuesday, 18 February 1964, at 10.30 a.m.

THE UNIVERSITY
OF MICHIGAN
APR 20 1964
DOCUMENT
COLLECTION

Chairman:

Mr. S.K. TSARAPKIN

(Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics)

64-05868

PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Brazil:

Mr. J. de CASTRO

Mr. E. HOSANNAH

Bulgaria:

Mr. G. GHELEV

Mr. D. TEHOV

Mr. G. YANKOV

Burma:

Mr. James BARRINGTON

U SEIN BWA

Canada:

Mr. E. L. M. BURNS

Mr. S.F. RAE

Mr. A.E. GOTLIEB

Mr. R.M. TAIT

Czechoslovakia:

Mr. M. ZEMLA

Mr. T. LAHODA

Mr. J. BUCEK

Mr. V. VAJNAR

Ethiopia:

Ato Abate AGEDE

Ato S. TEFERRA

India:

Mr. R.K. NEHRU

Mr. R. DAYAL

Mr. A.S. MEHTA

Mr. K. NARENDRANATH

Italy:

Mr. F. CAVALLETTI

Mr. E. GUIDOTTI

Mr. S. AVETTA

Mr. G.P. TOZZOLI

PRESENT AT THE TABLE (Cont'd)

Mexico:

Mr. Ernesto de SANTIAGO
Mr. Manuel TELLO
Miss Ofelia REYES RETANA

Nigeria:

Mr. L.C.N. OBI

Poland:

Mr. M. BLUSZTAJN
Mr. E. STANIEWSKI
Mr. J. GOLDBLAT
Mrs. H. CHLOND

Romania:

Mr. V. DUMITRESCU
Mr. E. GLASER
Mr. N. ECOBESCU
Mr. M. IONESCU

Sweden:

Mr. P. LIND
Mr. P. HAMMARSKJOLD
Mr. C.G. EKLUND
Mr. J. PRAWITZ

Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics:

Mr. S.K. TSARAPKIN
Mr. A.A. ROSCHIN
Mr. I.G. USACHEV
Mr. I.I. CHEPROV

United Arab Republic:

Mr. AHMED OSMAN
Mr. M. KASSEM
Mr. S.E. IBRAHIM
Mr. A.A. SALAM

PRESENT AT THE TABLE (Cont'd)

United Kingdom:

Sir Paul MASON

Mr. J.G. TAHOURDIN

Mr. J.M. EDES

United States of America:

Mr. W.C. FOSTER

Mr. A.L. RICHARDS

Mr. G. BUNN

Mr. R.A. MARTIN

Special Representative of the
Secretary-General:

Mr. D. PROTITCH

Deputy Special Representative
of the Secretary-General:

Mr. W. EPSTEIN

The CHAIRMAN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics): I declare open the one hundred and sixty-seventh meeting of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament.

Mr. BURNS (Canada): Today we should like to make a few points in relation to what was said by several delegations in the interesting discussion at our 165th meeting. The subject was the elimination of nuclear weapon vehicles and, in particular, the proposals which were advanced by Mr. Gromyko at the eighteenth session of the General Assembly in that regard (A/PV.1208, provisional p.71).

The Canadian delegation feels that it is not very productive to keep on arguing whether the West can or cannot agree in principle to the Gromyko proposals. Instead we should be thinking in terms of the numbers of the intercontinental ballistic missiles and other "vectors" which are involved. We think, too, that it is for the Soviet Union delegation to propose numbers. After all, these are its proposals. If I may again quote the English proverb "Never buy a pig in a poke" -- and, for the benefit of the translation, a "poke" is a bag -- it is the Soviet pig which is in the poke, and the Soviet Union should at least tell us the price, even if it is not willing to bring out the whole animal and let us see whether it is really worth buying. Of course, the first tentative suggestions on numbers of the missiles in the minimum nuclear deterrent could be made privately between representatives of nuclear Powers.

There is another reason why it would seem more appropriate for the Soviet Union to make the first suggestion concerning numbers, and it is that the numbers of intercontinental ballistic missiles and other nuclear weapon vehicles in the possession of the United States have been announced by Mr. McNamara -- and I shall quote them presently. However, there is great uncertainty about the numbers of intercontinental ballistic missiles in the possession of the Soviet Union. As a matter of policy, the Soviet Union keeps this a secret. That may have been necessary for military reasons, but obviously it imposes great difficulties in assessing the dimensions of any disarmament plans affecting nuclear weapon vehicles.

(Mr. Burns, Canada)

First of all, let us extract some more information from Mr. McNamara's speech of 18 November 1963 to the Economic Club of New York -- which has already been extensively quoted from in this Committee (ENDC/PV.165, p.29). He said the United States strategic nuclear forces now contained more than 500 operational long-range ballistic missiles -- Atlas, Titan, Minuteman, Polaris --, and that it is planned to increase their number to over 1,700 by 1966: that is by 1,200 in two years, or 50 a month. This is a definite figure given by the Secretary of Defense of the United States.

On the other hand, we do not know how many intercontinental ballistic missiles the Soviet Union has. The publication of the Institute for Strategic Studies, "The Military Balance 1963-64", which is an authority frequently used in our discussions, says that the Soviet Union has somewhat more than 100 intercontinental ballistic missiles. But a despatch from Moscow published in The New York Times of 24 January 1964 reported a Soviet announcement of tests of improved intercontinental rockets, said to be extremely accurate. The report added that the Soviet Union was said to have a stock of 1,000 of these intercontinental rockets capable of landing within less than one mile of their target. As well as intercontinental rockets, the Soviet Union -- again according to "The Military Balance 1963-64" -- has about 800 intermediate-range and medium-range ballistic missiles: that is, missiles of ranges between 1,000 and 3,250 kilometres. Besides these, of course, there are intercontinental bombers; and the Soviet Union has, as well, submarines which can launch ballistic missiles and these are not included in the figures given.

The problem is: to what number should we reduce this great and increasing number of ballistic missiles on both sides if we accept the Gromyko proposal? The spokesmen for the Warsaw Pact countries here have talked of a "strictly limited number" or a "minimal number". Perhaps they are thinking of a number around ten. Would the number ten give the kind of security, the assurance of deterrence, which it is claimed that the Gromyko idea of a balanced minimum nuclear deterrent -- or, as some delegations prefer ambiguously to call it, a "nuclear umbrella" -- would provide?

Mr. Tsarapkin has stated:

"... in order to put a modern intercontinental missile out of action it is not enough to aim at it, say, one or even two or three intercontinental missiles." (ENDC/PV.163, p.20)

(Mr. Burns, Canada)

As three intercontinental ballistic missiles would not do it, let us assume that four or five probably could. That would mean that, if thirty or forty intercontinental ballistic missiles were concealed over and above the ten which were allowed to be kept, the side which did so would have a sufficient superiority to destroy the missiles of the other side on their launching pads, thus destroying the deterrent. The concealment in territories of the size of the United States or of the Soviet Union of thirty or forty intercontinental ballistic missiles out of the total number available would not be impossible. If the side concealing the missiles in bad faith had also a fairly effective anti-missile missile defence, that would add to the imbalance. Perhaps those are the reasons why the Warsaw Pact countries have refrained from suggesting a very low number.

Now let us consider what the case would be if the number of missiles thought of as a minimum deterrent were 100. In that case, 300 or 400 missiles would have to be concealed in order to allow a defaulting nation any certainty of upsetting the deterrent. Manifestly it would be very difficult to conceal many large vehicles. The point of this argument is to indicate that the number of missiles in a balanced minimum deterrent, such as the Gromyko proposal envisages, should tend to be a higher number rather than a lower number.

What I have just said does not imply that a balanced deterrent need involve equality in the number of missiles. As far as I have been able to determine, neither the Soviet Union nor its allies have said that the number of missiles to be retained under the Gromyko proposal is to be the same for the United States and the Soviet Union. This, I might add, is another example of how little we know about what the Gromyko proposal actually involves.

There is another point to be considered in view of the considerable strength of the Soviet Union in intermediate and medium-range ballistic missiles. Suppose that the Gromyko proposals were implemented and that this created equality of power between the Soviet Union and the United States in intercontinental missiles: that would mean that it would be self-destroying for either side to initiate an exchange of these missiles which would be directed against cities. But let us consider further what would be the situation if, instead of all the intermediate-range and medium-range ballistic missiles being destroyed, ten or twenty of them were

(Mr. Burns, Canada)

clandestinely kept. These could constitute a means of pressure or threat against European members of NATO. European members of NATO can hardly ignore the possibility of the concealment of weapons of intermediate range, which could upset the existing balance, in view of events which took place in October 1962 and which created such a danger to peace.

How would a proposal on the lines suggested by Mr. Gromyko be verified? What has just been stated points to the necessity of a complete disclosure of the numbers and locations of existing intercontinental ballistic missiles, and unrestricted opportunity for inspection of all territories of missile-owning countries before reduction to a minimum balanced deterrent could be effected -- that is, effected in the one-stage operation which is the present Soviet Union proposal. The Soviet Union proposal for verification is only that inspectors might be present on the declared intercontinental ballistic missile launching pads at the second stage: that is, after the destruction of other nuclear weapon vehicles had been completed (ENDC/PV.114, p.40; PV.163, p.24). That is manifestly insufficient.

Looking at the Soviet Union proposal in this way, one sees that it runs into what are essentially the same objections, with regard to verification and the possibility of the gaining of advantage by one State or group of States, as were advanced against the original Soviet proposal -- that is, before the Gromyko amendments -- to destroy all nuclear weapon vehicles without exception in the first stage (ENDC/2).

At our meeting of 11 February the representative of Czechoslovakia quoted me as saying:

"Of course the Canadian delegation agrees that the fewer clubs of this kind there are the better ..." (ENDC/PV.165, p.8).

Of course, by "club" I meant the kind of club with which you hit someone, not the kind of club you join for recreation. That remark of mine, if taken without qualification, might appear to contradict what I have just been saying. It is indeed true that the fewer nuclear "clubs" there are the safer we should all be -- and these are "clubs" with which to threaten or retaliate. But of course, in reducing to this minimum number from the very great number of these nuclear "clubs" which now exist, we must comply with the principles of adequate verification and avoidance of giving military advantage to one side or the other.

(Mr. Burns, Canada)

We were struck also by Mr. Simovic's remark:

"Further accumulation of nuclear weapons and their delivery vehicles, their constant improvement and further dissemination, would increase to an even greater extent the danger of a situation which is already highly dangerous." (ibid., p.5)

The Canadian delegation agrees with this, and would point out that the "freeze" proposal advanced by the United States (ENDC/120) would be the quickest and best means of stopping a further increase of the danger. We very much hope that the Czechoslovak delegation, the Soviet Union delegation and others of the Warsaw Pact countries represented here will give their views on this "freeze" proposal before long.

We should like also to refer to remarks made by the representative of Romania at our meeting of 11 February (ENDC/PV.165, p.29). He gave an extensive quotation from Mr. McNamara's speech of 18 November 1963 which represented the NATO forces in Europe as being substantially equivalent to the Warsaw Pact forces. Mr. McNamara's argument related to the balance as it is today -- certainly not as it would be if the provisions in the Soviet first-stage disarmament plan were put into effect, when all United States, United Kingdom and Canadian forces would be eliminated from Europe and all their bases dismantled. Another point that might be taken from Mr. McNamara's statement is the following:

"None of this is to say that NATO strength on the ground in Europe is adequate to turn back without nuclear weapons an all-out surprise non-nuclear attack."

We note also that the representative of Romania says that for implementation of the measure which is now the Soviet Union's position -- elimination of all nuclear vehicles in the first stage, apart from the known exceptions --

"it will be necessary and possible to establish beforehand appropriate and generally acceptable measures under strict international control".

(ENDC/PV.165, p.30).

The Canadian delegation has just pointed out how strict and extensive international control would have to be; and we doubt that the Soviet Union could agree to verification of the kind I have described. Let us, by way of contrast, look at the United States proposal for a "freeze" on the most powerful means of

(Mr. Burns, Canada)

delivery of nuclear weapons. Although we have not heard full particulars, we have been told that the verification measures would apply mainly to certain types of factories where these nuclear weapon vehicles were made and to certain testing facilities. Agreement not to make more intercontinental ballistic missiles would be the first big step towards their reduction and eventual elimination.

Another point which the representative of Romania made was that during the negotiations for disarmament under the auspices of the League of Nations in the 1930s the formula "Disarmament, security, arbitration" became an obstacle to disarmament; and he quoted the vicious circle of argument:

"I am not disarming, because I do not feel safe. I do not feel safe,

because there is no disarmament". (ibid.)

That is certainly not a complete picture. A nation comes to fear its neighbours when those neighbours announce policies which are inimical to the nation's vital interests, and when the neighbours also possess the armaments which might be used to enforce those policies. Therefore it was certainly right to include "arbitration" -- in the broadest sense -- in the formula. Unless we have peaceful means of settling disputes, we can have neither complete disarmament nor security. One may hope that Mr. Khrushchev's letter of 31 December 1963 to a number of Heads of State is a recognition of that fact, and that negotiations to decide on means of peacefully settling disputes may develop from it.

Mr. CAVALLETTI (Italy) (translation from French): During the general discussion the Italian delegation reaffirmed the great importance attached by its Government to a treaty on general and complete disarmament, and the hopes and feelings with which it approaches the work of elaborating that treaty (ENDC/PV.157, p.29). Hence I need not repeat general statements, and I should like to embark on the examination of the concrete problems facing us in connexion with the first stage of disarmament, which is the subject under discussion at the present meeting.

(Mr. Cavalletti, Italy)

Several delegations have already taken the floor in this debate, and I have studied their remarks with the greatest care. I am happy to observe that all these statements, even those with which I can but partially agree, appear to me to have been made in a spirit of good will and sincere collaboration which augurs well for our hopes and enhances the importance of some of the first signs of rapprochement which we are beginning to perceive.

The approximation of the opposing contentions is a subject on which several delegations have rightly insisted. The long debates on general and complete disarmament which took place here during earlier sessions have not been in vain, for they have effectively reduced the gap between certain sections of the two draft treaties. You know the points on which concessions have been made on both sides, and we have had occasion at previous meetings to illustrate the concessions made by the Western delegations. I shall therefore not dwell on this subject again.

The agenda of the present meeting draws our attention to Mr. Gromyko's proposal in its most recent wording (ENDC/2/Rev.1/Add.1), and my delegation approaches this important question in a spirit of collaboration, as the representative of Canada, Mr. Burns, has already done today with his usual clarity.

In the matter of nuclear disarmament, the Soviet delegation set out from a position very far removed from ours, and at first proposed the elimination of all atomic weapons from the very outset of disarmament (ENDC/2). While naturally sharing this aspiration, the Western delegations proved by irrefutable arguments at past session that this drastic measure was unrealizable in practice. Accordingly the Soviet Government, realizing this impossibility, subsequently agreed that a certain number of nuclear missiles might be retained during the second and third stages of disarmament: that is to say, until the end of the disarmament process. That is an idea which agrees with our own, and, in regard to this principle, the Italian delegation recognizes with satisfaction that the possibilities of a rapprochement have somewhat improved.

Nevertheless, there are many other points on which uncertainties and considerable differences of opinion remain. To begin with, we do not know the size of the "deterrent" which, according to the Soviet proposal, would be retained at the end of the first stage. The Soviet delegation is ready to negotiate on this question; but, as the matter stands at present, this leaves a gap, and a serious one at that. Mr. Burns' statement this morning brought that out very clearly.

(Mr. Cavalletti, Italy)

I fear, however, that the most serious obstacles, the real stumbling blocks, are to be found elsewhere. They exist either in the system of reductions in asymmetrical quantities suggested for intercontinental missiles, or in the other disarmament measures which are part and parcel of Mr. Gromyko's proposal. That proposal does not refer only to the retention of a "nuclear umbrella"; it is concerned with many other measures envisaged for the first stage and, in particular, with the elimination of all nuclear weapon delivery vehicles, and with the withdrawal of foreign troops and of all so-called foreign bases.

In our opinion -- and in saying this we take our stand on the Agreed Principles (ENDC/5) -- a global agreement on general and complete disarmament, be it for the first or the subsequent stages, must provide for reductions and other measures for each stage which are well-balanced, well-integrated and mutually supplement one another. In other words, within the framework of an agreement on a given stage, a uniform criterion of reduction should be applied to all the components of a military structure so that there should be no imbalance on either side. Of course, I am speaking of a serious imbalance, for we are not dealing with a mathematically-precise equilibrium, which in any case it is impossible to achieve.

The Committee has not sufficiently reliable or detailed technical knowledge to evaluate the components of the military structure. Nevertheless, the current impression -- the impression, I would say, of the man-in-the-street -- is that the present military balance probably implies a superiority of the Eastern bloc in conventional armaments and a Western superiority in nuclear armaments. This situation is of particular concern to the West European countries which, because of their territorial contiguity with the East, might be exposed to a surprise attack carried out by superior conventional means. This is one of the principal reasons why the countries of Western Europe are grouped together with the United States of America and Canada in an integrated defensive alliance.

If nuclear arms were reduced asymmetrically while conventional arms were reduced in equal percentages, and if at the same time the integrated defensive organization set up in Europe with the participation of the United States were destroyed, the ensuing situation would obviously be dangerous for Western security and for peace.

(Mr. Cavalletti, Italy)

To be more specific, I should like very briefly to review the military situation in which, according to the Soviet proposals, Western Europe would find itself at the end of the first stage.

First, in Western Europe all atomic weapon delivery vehicles, without exception, would be destroyed. The same situation would arise in East European countries, but not in Russia, where such vehicles would be retained; albeit in limited numbers.

Secondly, in Western Europe all integrated military installations established over a number of years with the assistance of United States armies -- bases, airfields, and infrastructures -- would be abolished. In the Soviet Union, military installations would remain intact.

Thirdly, conventional arms would be reduced by 30 per cent on both sides. But this reduction would not affect the superiority of the Eastern countries in conventional armaments, characterized in particular by the presence of large armoured forces.

Fourthly, United States and Canadian forces would have left the Continent. As to the Western European forces, large contingents would be stationed beyond the Channel, while other detachments would be dispersed over several geographical areas. On the other hand, the forces of the Warsaw Treaty countries, including a contingent of 1,900,000 Russian troops, would remain in a unified and compact group, capable of being easily and rapidly concentrated wherever desired. The Soviet Union would also have at its disposal a much greater number of recently-demobilized trained reserves which could easily be remobilized.

Fifthly, the West European forces would not have sufficient geographical depth of manoeuvre. They could be easily and rapidly pushed back to the sea, while the Eastern forces, having immense territorial expanses behind them, would have the greatest facility of movement.

Sixthly, in case of a European conflict, intervention by the United States forces, already handicapped by distance and the transportation of material, would meet with the most serious difficulties. These forces would not find in Europe a sufficient military infrastructure, most of which would have been dismantled.

These are but a few objective facts which cannot be ignored in a study of the application of a disarmament process; although, fortunately, the hypothesis

(Mr. Cavalletti, Italy)

to which these data refer is a purely theoretical one. We should like to believe in the genuineness of the declarations of peace and collaboration which reach us more and more often from the Warsaw Treaty countries, and to which we respond in a sincere and friendly spirit. However, as we are dealing with disarmament, we cannot avoid making an objective evaluation of the military factors, such as they are, while hoping that the gradual re-establishment of mutual confidence will eventually make them irrelevant.

I believe that, in speaking of the situation in Western Europe, I have expressed views which go beyond strictly European considerations. Our concept of Western security is comprehensive, and we think no member of the Western alliance can be endangered without the others being endangered as well. Moreover, we are convinced that any serious disturbance of the existing balance is in itself contrary to the general interest; for, as long as blocs exist, security and peace are based on this balance. We must do everything we can to by-pass those blocs and endeavour, by progressive disarmament, to achieve a situation in which military alliances will no longer have any reason to exist. Italy has the firm intention of contributing to the bringing about of this new situation, and remains convinced that this can be done by the gradual and balanced reduction of all the components of military organization on both sides.

These are not new arguments. Our Eastern partners are well aware of them, for during these negotiations they have begun to recognize their cogency, as is proved by Mr. Gromyko's proposal. This proposal is an admission of the requirements we have outlined. True, it is only a partial admission. It should be elaborated and developed so as to produce a solution of the problems I have raised; in any case it remains a sign of goodwill.

Once the need for preserving an equitable and reasonable balance of armaments has been universally recognized, it will certainly not be impossible to find compromise formulae between the views of the East and the West. With patience, with an open mind, without intransigence or rigidity, we shall seek a means of reaching an agreement satisfactory to all.

Much more could be said, both on the extent of the control necessary for such far-reaching disarmament measures as those contained in Mr. Gromyko's proposals, and on the setting-up of a peace machinery concomitant and parallel with the large-scale elimination of armaments. I should not like to take up any more of your time today, and will revert to these questions at a later meeting.

(Mr. Cavalletti, Italy)

However, before concluding I should like to emphasize once more, as the Canadian delegation has just done, that before proceeding with such a complex and vast operation as that of the almost complete destruction of missiles and nuclear devices, measures such as "freezing" and standstill arrangements appear to us as an essential first step which is much easier to accomplish. If the Eastern delegations really wish, as we do, to put an end to the nuclear danger as quickly as possible, these are measures on which agreement should be reached without delay and which would open up, as the whole world desires, a clear path towards the eventual material destruction of nuclear armaments.

Mr. BLUSZTAJN (Poland) (translation from French): Last Tuesday we had the pleasure of hearing the United States representative, Mr. Foster (ENDC/PV.165, pp. 19 et seq.). We were awaiting his speech with great interest, for it was the first time that the United States delegation had had an opportunity to make known officially its Government's attitude towards the latest Soviet proposal concerning nuclear disarmament (ENDC/2/Rev.1/Add.1). We hope that the views expressed by Mr. Foster were only preliminary, and that the United States Government has not yet said its last word on the subject. I am therefore taking the liberty of presenting to you today a few comments inspired by the attitude of the United States delegation, in the hope that it will take them into account when determining its final position.

We had hoped that the adoption by the Soviet Union of the idea of a "nuclear umbrella" -- or, as Mr. Burns prefers to call it, a nuclear "club or cudgel" (ENDC/PV.163, p.15) -- would remove the last obstacle barring the road towards agreement on the key problem of general and complete disarmament.

Of course the idea of a "nuclear umbrella" is not a new one and enjoys quite considerable support among Western disarmament experts. It was only put forward by the socialist delegations because we thought that this would facilitate agreement. As far as we are concerned, we still believe that only the total destruction of all nuclear weapon delivery vehicles in the first stage of disarmament is realistic, and that it provides the best means of eliminating once and for all the threat of a nuclear conflict.

(Mr. Blusztajn, Poland)

To my great surprise the arguments put forward by the United States delegation last Tuesday hardly differed from the objections it had previously raised to the Soviet plan for general and complete disarmament in its original form (ENDC/2). One might even think that the United States delegation refuses to see all the differences that exist between the Soviet plan of 1962 and the Gromyko plan of September 1963. What is still more surprising is that the United States delegation appears not to want to draw all the logical conclusions from the evolution of its own views on the role and importance attributed to the problem of nuclear weapon delivery vehicles. Yet we noted this evolution in the statement made by Mr. Foster at our meeting of 31 January when he said that ---

"We believe first attention should be directed to the long-range weapons of greatest destructiveness",

which he rightly described as ---

"... weapons which appear most threatening to all countries" (ENDC/PV.162, p.18).

A similar tendency became apparent in the attitude of the United Kingdom delegation, whose leader Mr. Thomas, at our Committee's meeting of 30 January (ENDC/PV.161, pp.16-18), recognized the key role played by nuclear weapon delivery vehicles and by the nuclear weapons themselves in the search for a solution of the problem of general and complete disarmament.

Now then can we fail to be surprised when we find that the arguments of the United States representative against the latest Soviet proposal are based on the idea that those deadly and dangerous weapons, which he himself says should be treated differently, are from the point of view of the programme of general and complete disarmament merely weapons like any others? Can we accept the contention that what is true when considered from the point of view of collateral measures becomes false when considered in relation to general and complete disarmament? Is it not surprising that the United States plan of 1962 (ENDC/30) has not undergone any substantial modifications since that time?

(Mr. Blusztajn, Poland)

With regard to that plan, it would even seem that the United States delegation has made a retrograde step by proposing that its application should be preceded by a freeze in the field of nuclear weapons (ENDC/120). Hitherto all the proposals relative to a freeze have been considered as belonging to the so-called collateral measures. Are we to conclude that the United States delegation has abandoned this position and now makes the first disarmament stage depend on a new prerequisite? I think that some explanation on this point is called for from the United States delegation.

Before dealing with the substance of the problem, I should like to say that the Polish delegation appreciates the endeavour by our United States colleagues to initiate in this Committee a debate on the latest Soviet proposal, which on their own admission is not lacking in clarity. We note with satisfaction that our United States colleagues have given up the tactics of raising questions of detail of secondary importance. We are also pleased to note that this example has been followed today by our colleagues from Canada and Italy. There is therefore no need to place the debate on a different level, and the Polish delegation proposes to deal with this problem in its general aspects.

If I understand them correctly, the objections raised to the new Soviet nuclear disarmament plan can roughly be summed up as follows: it is claimed that the Soviet plan is contrary to the principle of balance because it would alter the structure of armaments in favour of the Soviet Union.

Thus, in the opinion of the United States delegation, only a percentage reduction of all weapons can guarantee a balanced disarmament process. This is true from the purely arithmetical point of view, but the reality is considerably more complex. As the United States representative, Mr. Foster, rightly pointed out in his statement last week (ENDC/PV.165, p.22), the armaments structure of different countries depends on a large number of factors. Nevertheless, he omitted to mention one factor which in my opinion is perhaps the most important of all: the task which the different countries assign to their respective armed forces. Clearly this factor determines the composition of their armaments.

(Mr. Blusztajn, Poland)

Similarly, it is clear that the weight attached to the various types of armament within the framework of a composite army also varies. The application of the same reduction coefficient to armaments as different, for example, as nuclear weapon delivery vehicles and machine guns is likely to upset the balance of the armaments structure, so dear to the United States delegation. For, in the last resort, it is of less importance that the armaments reductions should be balanced than that the criteria for them should be determined rationally, in order to make certain that, once the reduction has been completed, the general balance will be maintained. One cannot help feeling that the United States delegation considers the establishment of such criteria a completely impracticable task.

In his statement Mr. Foster proceeded from the assumption that a balance exists at present between the destructive capacities of the two sides. Clearly he meant a balance of strategic and nuclear weapons. It is difficult to see, however, why this balance should be upset if the latest Soviet proposal is carried out -- in other words, after the elimination of the over-kill capacity, when the United States and the Soviet Union would only be allowed to retain an agreed number of intercontinental missiles. Could a better way of safeguarding the strategic balance between the two sides be devised? We are bound to associate ourselves with the views expressed on this subject by the Soviet Union representative, who emphasized quite rightly that such a structure of nuclear armaments, left in the hands of the two Powers during the process of disarmament, offered the best guarantee against a possible aggression (ENDC/PV.163, pp.19 et seq.).

In defending his concept of a percentage reduction of nuclear weapon delivery vehicles, the United States representative, Mr. Foster, is seeking a guarantee that the present armaments structure will not be modified. As we have just shown, that is not necessarily the case. But, even if we were to take up the same line of reasoning as the United States representative, we should arrive at opposite conclusions.

I am sure Mr. Foster will agree with me that the structure of armaments is the result of a dynamic evolution. It reflects a whole series of technological, economic and political facts. These facts are certainly not fortuitous; they can be shaped according to our will.

(Mr. Blusztajn, Poland)

I also think the United States representative will agree with me that the present structure of armaments guaranteeing the strategic balance of the two sides is not perfect from the point of view of international security. If that is so, the maintenance of such a balance, even at a lower level, cannot be considered as an advantage in a disarmament plan. The present situation compels us to seek a formula which would enable us to modify that structure in the general interest and in the interest of universal peace. The latest Soviet proposal makes a positive contribution in this direction, while the United States delegation has entrenched itself behind positions which render the accomplishment of our Committee's task difficult, if not impossible.

I should not like to deal today with all the problems raised in our United States colleague's speech. I should merely like to observe in passing that the United States delegation has not modified its attitude with regard to the problem of control and the preservation of peace during the disarmament process, although obviously a revision is called for in the light of the latest proposals submitted by the Soviet Union. I shall perhaps have occasion to make certain comments on this subject in my future statements.

I should like to conclude by expressing the hope that the discussion we have only just initiated will end by bringing the positions of the two sides closer together. The Soviet Union has made a considerable effort of compromise. It is now for the delegations of the Western Powers to show a similar attitude.

Mr. NEHRU (India): I should like to begin by saying a word about our work in the past. Since our Committee was set up some two years ago, we have discussed many aspects of the problem of disarmament. We have not been able to reach an agreement or to draft a treaty. Nevertheless, our discussions, which have been based on the alternative plans of the Soviet Union (ENDC/2/Rev.1 and Add.1) and the United States (ENDC/30 and Corr.1 and Add.1,2,3), have been of some value. They have helped to throw light on divergent points of view and have also, to some extent, lessened the divergences.

(Mr. Nehru, India)

Thus, in regard to the level of armed forces, some change has been made in the Soviet plan. The gap which exists between the two plans has been somewhat narrowed. In regard to conventional weapons, a similar change has been made in the Soviet plan. Those are relatively small changes, but they are a good augury for the future. They show that the discussions which have taken place in our Committee have led to some results.

Our new session has now started, and we are continuing the discussions. We have taken up again the question of elimination of nuclear delivery vehicles. On that question many of our colleagues have made important statements. Some were made at earlier meetings, others have been made today. My delegation has studied those statements and will continue to study them. As our discussion is continuing, we have not yet formulated our views. However, I should like to mention briefly some thoughts which have occurred to us during those discussions.

On the importance of this question there can be no difference of opinion. As some of our colleagues have pointed out, the elimination of nuclear delivery vehicles lies at the very heart of the problem of disarmament. We agree with that view, but we should like to make a further suggestion. The danger which threatens the world is not confined to the nuclear arms race; the building-up of large armies by an aggressive or expansionist Power is also a source of danger. However, we agree that the nuclear arms race and the accumulation of delivery vehicles have given rise to a grave problem. Apart from the wastage of resources which could be put to more productive uses, there is also a threat not merely to peace but to the very survival of humanity. That threat is a growing threat as the nuclear arms race continues and is extended to some other countries. Therefore an agreement for ending the race and for reducing and eliminating nuclear armaments is an urgent necessity.

There is a further consideration which points in the same direction. Our primary task in this Committee is to negotiate an agreement on general and complete disarmament. We have been asked by the General Assembly to undertake these negotiations with energy and determination (A/RES/1908 (XVIII); ENDC/116). Lack of progress on specific questions, including the elimination of nuclear delivery vehicles, is hindering a larger agreement. That is a matter which needs some consideration. The longer an agreement is delayed, the more difficult it might become later to find some solution to a problem which we have not yet considered

(Mr. Nehru, India)

fully. The problem is how to ensure acceptance of an agreement on disarmament by countries which are not taking part in these negotiations. Unless the agreement is accepted by all militarily-important countries, it could hardly be put into effect. It is necessary, therefore, to speed up our discussion of specific questions so that conditions may be created which will enable us to draft an agreement on general and complete disarmament at the earliest possible date.

On the specific questions which we are now discussing, alternative plans or proposals have been placed before our Committee. There is a Soviet plan for the elimination of nuclear delivery vehicles, and there is also a United States plan. Some parts of both the plans are new, while others are old. The plans have been explained to us by our colleagues from the Soviet Union and the United States. Other colleagues have also helped to clarify the plans. We are grateful for all the explanations and have endeavoured, to the best of our ability, to examine the two plans. Our ability is, of course, limited because we have no real experience or knowledge of nuclear armaments. We neither possess such armaments nor desire to possess them. We do not regard possession of nuclear weapons or delivery vehicles as a symbol of status. However, we have examined the two plans in the light of the explanations and of the Joint Statement of Agreed Principles (ENDC/5).

Bearing in mind the imperative need of an early agreement on this question, we have considered, first, the changes, or new points, in each plan which might help to widen the area of agreement; secondly, the points on which there is disagreement; and, thirdly, possible ways of reducing the disagreement. With regard to changes in the two plans, we find that both have broken some new ground. We welcome these initiatives. The Soviet Union has made an important change in its disarmament plan. It has now proposed that agreed numbers of missiles, or a limited nuclear deterrent, may be retained during the entire process of disarmament (ENDC/2/Rev.1/Add.1). This is a new proposal which brings the Soviet plan somewhat closer to the United States plan. As Mr. Foster has pointed out (ENDC/PV.165, p.21), the United States plan also provides for the retention of a limited deterrent until the end of the third stage.

The Soviet proposal has helped to remove one of the obstacles to an agreement. There are, of course, other obstacles, and the road to an agreement is still not clear. Nor is it a happy circumstance that peace should have to depend on what has been described at our meetings as the threat of nuclear blows and counter-blows. However, we recognize that the situation today is such that the retention of some kind of deterrent has become more or less unavoidable. There seems to be

(Mr. Nehru, India)

no other way in which agreement can be reached on this important question. If some sort of deterrent is considered essential for the preservation of peace, it is obviously better to reduce it in scale.

The United States has also made a new proposal. While the plan for the elimination of nuclear delivery vehicles remains unchanged, there is a new proposal to begin the disarmament process with a verified "freeze" of the number and characteristics of strategic nuclear vehicles (ENDC/120). We should like to know the Soviet reaction to this proposal. In principle we should welcome a "freeze", if it could be carried out under conditions acceptable to both sides. Each side has stated that its nuclear arsenal is such that it could inflict irreparable damage on the other. If that is so, is it really necessary to continue to produce more and better types of strategic nuclear vehicles? Mr. Foster has assured us that the verification procedure in the United States plan will not be onerous (ENDC/PV.166, p.18). Perhaps it might be easier to reach agreement if the "freeze" could be linked in some way with an agreed plan for the elimination of nuclear delivery vehicles. Another alternative is to consider the possibility of a "freeze" in some limited area which might reduce existing dangers and clear the way for larger agreements.

There are other points in the two plans on which our discussion is continuing. We hope that that discussion will widen the area of agreement. The Soviet plan seems to provide for the establishment of the limited deterrent at the end of the first stage. It has been suggested by some of our colleagues that this point needs confirmation. The size and shape of the deterrent, under the Soviet plan, will be fixed by mutual agreement after the principle has been accepted. The United States plan provides for reduction on a percentage basis throughout the three stages. The percentage will be the same for each side, in each stage, and the limited deterrent will be established towards the end of the third stage.

Some of the points in both the plans seem to need further clarification. The question has been raised whether clarification, or discussion of details, should precede or follow acceptance of a proposal in principle. Another question which has been raised is: how much, or what parts, of a proposal should be accepted in principle before matters of detail can be discussed. We hope that such questions will not come in the way of our work. In the course of further discussions some points which are still not clear and which can be clarified at this stage will no doubt receive our attention.

(Mr. Nehru, India)

A few points which have occurred to us are:

At what stage of the disarmament process is the limited deterrent to be established? If it is confirmed that under the Soviet plan it is to be established at the end of the first stage, what are the difficulties involved in accepting that proposal? The overburdening of the first stage has been mentioned as a possible difficulty. If hundreds of missiles have to be destroyed, can effective arrangements be made in the very first stage of the disarmament process for verification under conditions which would be acceptable to both sides?

Another difficulty relates to the question of balance. Under the Agreed Principles, neither side is to gain a unilateral advantage in any stage of the disarmament process. If under the Soviet plan all nuclear delivery vehicles except land-based missiles in national territories, which would be reduced to a low level, were to be eliminated from national arsenals, would that not violate the principle of balance? Alternatively, would a uniform percentage cut across the board help to preserve the balance?

A third question relates to peace-keeping. If there were drastic cuts in armaments and no steps were taken simultaneously to build an effective peace-keeping force or to develop agreed procedures for the peaceful settlement of disputes, would that not lessen the sense of security?

Mr. Foster and other colleagues have raised some of these questions. We have no doubt that they will be answered in the course of our discussions.

With regard to overburdening, or major reductions of armaments in the first stage, there are some considerations which might be kept in mind. Naturally, effective arrangements must be made for verification. It seems to us, however, that the larger the scale of disarmament which is accepted for the first stage, the easier it might be to overcome some of the difficulties which verification presents. Substantial disarmament in the first stage might also help to give a greater impetus to the disarmament process. We are not committed to a particular scale, and we hope that all such matters will form the subject of negotiations.

(Mr. Nehru, India)

On the issue of balance, the question has been raised whether the Soviet plan would not modify in favour of the Soviet Union the present "mix" of armaments. Why have missile-launching submarines, on which the West relies more than the Soviet Union, been excluded from the limited nuclear deterrent? If they are included on the ground of their greater invulnerability, how is verification to be carried out? Both sides have agreed that the missiles which will be retained will be subject to verification.

Another question is whether balance could be preserved by applying uniform percentage cuts in each stage of the disarmament process. If one side is weaker than the other in some important field of armaments, should not the percentage be varied in return for a similar variation in some other field in which the other side is stronger?

The question of peace-keeping is also important. We agree with the view that, simultaneously with the progress of disarmament, effective steps should be taken to build up international peace-keeping machinery. It does not seem to us enough to rely for international peace-keeping on the limited deterrent in the hands of the two great Powers. On the procedures for the peaceful settlement of territorial and other disputes, we hope that some agreement will emerge from the suggestions which have been made in regard to that matter by Chairman Khrushchev (ENDC/123) and President Johnson (ENDC/120).

I have mentioned some of our thoughts, and we shall look forward to further statements from our colleagues. We hope that those statements will help to clarify some of the points. Our task in this Committee is to widen the area of agreement. If clarification cannot be given in formal meetings, perhaps it might be possible to discuss some of these matters informally. Suggestions have been made for setting up working groups, which may not be acceptable to one side or the other. Informal meetings would be a possible alternative. They could be held either bilaterally between the two sides or among larger groups. We hope that some such effort will be made, as an agreement on the question before us today is of vital importance and an urgent necessity, for the reasons which I gave at the beginning of my statement.

The CHAIRMAN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translation from Russian): The Soviet delegation has listened very attentively to the statements made here at a number of meetings on the problem of general and complete disarmament. All the speakers have acknowledged the decisive importance of the proposal of the Soviet Government (ENDC/2/Rev.1/Add.1) that the so-called "nuclear umbrella" should be retained at the disposal of the Soviet Union and the United States until the end of the disarmament process. This proposal has not only given a new impetus to the negotiations but, as many speakers have pointed out, has opened up good prospects for the solution of the most important problems of the whole programme of general and complete disarmament.

In this connexion it is necessary to note the profound and well-considered statements made by the representatives of Bulgaria, Poland, Czechoslovakia and Romania, who have eloquently and most convincingly supported the Soviet proposal. They have thrown light on its various aspects and shown its positive significance for the solution of the problem of general and complete disarmament as a whole.

A positive appreciation of our proposal has also been expressed by the representatives of a number of non-aligned countries, both at the eighteenth session of the General Assembly and in the general debate in our Committee. I have already quoted in my intervention of 4 February (ENDC/PV.163, pp.25 et seq.) a number of statements made by representatives of non-aligned States, who described the Soviet proposal for a "nuclear umbrella" as a most important step towards the elaboration of an agreement on general and complete disarmament.

The statements of the representatives of the Western Powers -- I have in mind particularly their statements at the meeting of 11 February (ENDC/PV.165) -- were obviously discouraging, and we cannot conceal our disappointment in this regard. During the first days of the Committee's work the delegations of the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada and Italy uttered many fine words in the general debate to the effect that the time for fruitless discussion had passed and that we should get down to serious, business-like work without delay. Moreover, they quite rightly pointed out that there are at this very moment particularly favourable possibilities of doing so. It was therefore natural that we expected from the Western representatives reciprocal, constructive steps,

(The Chairman, USSR)

equivalent to the step taken by the Soviet Government. We expected from them new ideas, a new approach and a realistic change for the better in their positions. Unfortunately, however, apart from pious hopes and general statements to the effect that the Soviet proposal is interesting, we really have not heard anything from the Western representatives.

The main and, I would say, the only motif, which kept being repeated in the statements of the representatives of the Western Powers, boiled down to the following: that they need further explanations, that they are not in a position to evaluate the Soviet proposal, and that first it is necessary to reach agreement on all kinds of details. Although at first, after the Soviet Union had submitted its proposal to extend the "nuclear umbrella" until the end of the third stage of disarmament, the representatives of the Western Powers praised the proposal in every possible way, as time went by reservations and doubts began to be mingled with this positive attitude, and then they started saying straight out that it was unacceptable to the Western Powers. However, let us see whether there is anything vague and indefinite in the Soviet proposal.

In putting forward our proposal to extend the "nuclear umbrella" until the end of the third stage of disarmament, we explained it in all its aspects and examined all its probable consequences from the point of view of solving the key problems of disarmament and the requirements for ensuring the security of States (ENDC/PV.163, pp.18 et seq.). We explained very thoroughly to the Western Powers that the purpose of the "nuclear umbrella" was to provide additional safeguards for the security of States, those very safeguards which the Western Powers considered indispensable.

It was stressed that the "nuclear umbrella" should be minimal in respect of its quantity, so as not to provide the material possibility for unleashing and waging a nuclear war.

We explained what the "nuclear umbrella" should consist of, and indicated the specific categories and types of missiles. We explained to our Western partners that the number of missiles of various types and categories to be retained must be agreed between us, and that we should be prepared to begin drafting specific proposals in this regard together with our Western partners as soon as we had reached agreement on the principle of the matter.

(The Chairman, USSR)

We explained by whom this "nuclear umbrella" should be retained: namely, that it should be exclusively at the disposal of the Soviet Union and the United States in their own territories.

We indicated when the "nuclear umbrella" should begin to exist, and proposed that this measure should be put into effect as from the end of the first stage of disarmament.

We also explained the question of how long the Soviet Union and the United States could retain at their disposal the missiles which would be left to them under our proposal. Taking into account the views put forward by the Western Powers, the Soviet Union proposed that the "nuclear umbrella" should be maintained during the second and third stages of disarmament.

We also gave explanations regarding the control measures that would be applied in connexion with the "nuclear umbrella". We suggested that the retained missiles could be controlled directly at the launching pads.

Lastly, we analyzed from every angle and in the greatest detail the favourable consequences which agreement on a "nuclear umbrella" would have for the solution of other questions of general and complete disarmament.

Thus, the Soviet delegation has done the maximum of what is necessary for the understanding of the gist of our proposal and its underlying principle. These explanations make it fully possible for our partners to take a decision on the principle, after which we could get down in real earnest to agreeing on all the specific questions relating to the implementation of our proposal, which arise from such an agreement in principle. In general, as you see, the proposition is not at all "vague" or indefinite", as the representatives of the Western Powers try to describe it.

As a matter of fact, the statements of the Western representatives, if you read them carefully, show quite unequivocally that they fully understand the meaning and purport of our proposal. Thus, for example, in his statement of 11 February the representative of the United States, Mr. Foster, carefully analyzed the substance of the proposal of the Soviet Government, and pointed out that it provides for the elimination of nuclear weapon delivery vehicles with the exception of a small quantity or, to use his own words, reductions "to some very low level" on both sides by the end of the first stage. Mr. Foster added:

(The Chairman, USSR)

"That level would then be continued to the end of disarmament. If that is so, we appear to be rather far from agreement." (ENDC/PV.165, p.22)

It is evident from this quotation that Mr. Foster has not only understood the Soviet proposal but has already formed a quite definite opinion of his own. He said that the Soviet proposal was unacceptable to the United States. Consequently, the attempts of the representatives of the United States, the United Kingdom, Italy and Canada to pretend that they are not in a position to evaluate the Soviet proposal lead them into contradiction with the real situation and do not sound convincing.

The representative of the United Kingdom, Sir Paul Mason, explained his inability to take a definite position in regard to our proposal by saying:

"... nor have we agreed yet on the peace-keeping arrangements which will have to be introduced and in operation before national nuclear deterrents can be dismantled." (ibid., p.14)

Sir Paul Mason went on to say that the question of peace-keeping arrangements as well as other factors would "have to go into the equation which we are all trying to resolve." (ibid.)

Undoubtedly the problem of maintaining peace, both in the process of disarmament and after its completion, is of great importance, and the Soviet delegation will be prepared to discuss that question in due course. I would remind you that the Soviet draft treaty on general and complete disarmament contains a whole series of provisions in that regard. But is it admissible to state the question in the way the United Kingdom representative has stated it: namely, that agreement on the "nuclear umbrella" can be reached only after we have agreed on peace-keeping arrangements? If we were to take that path, all disarmament questions would be mixed up in an incredible tangle. We should have an equation with so many unknown quantities that we should be unable to solve it in any way, and we should never succeed at all in reaching agreement on the question of disarmament.

I do not think there is any need to analyze again the complete invalidity of the formula in which disarmament is set in opposition to the security of States, while the security of States is set in opposition to disarmament. This aspect of the question was dealt with very clearly and convincingly by the representative of the Romanian People's Republic, Mr. Dumitrescu, who in his statement based himself on international experience, the experience of the League of Nations, which led the negotiations on disarmament into a hopeless impasse by exactly the same fundamentally unsound setting of disarmament in opposition to the security of States (ibid., p.30)

(The Chairman, USSR)

Let us now turn to another question, which was raised in the statement of the representative of Canada (ENDC/PV.163, pp.14, 15) and also in the statements of the representatives of the United States (ENDC/PV.165, pp.21,22) and the United Kingdom (ibid., p.14). They said that they failed to understand what phases were covered by the Soviet proposal. Yet to anyone who has acquainted himself with the proposals of the Soviet Government and the draft treaty we have submitted, the sequence of the destruction of nuclear weapon delivery vehicles is absolutely clear. Apparently we shall have to repeat it once again: in the first stage of disarmament, all -- and I stress the word "all" -- nuclear weapon delivery vehicles must be eliminated, with the exception of a limited and agreed quantity of missiles of specified categories and types, which will remain at the disposal of the Soviet Union and the United States. These remaining missiles will be eliminated at the end of the third stage. The sequence of the measures is specific and clear. What other kind of "phasing" can there be? In any case one thing is clear: namely, that our documents contain an absolutely definite answer to this question.

In complaining of the "vagueness" of our proposal for the "nuclear umbrella", the representatives of the Western Powers have at the same time tried to make out that agreement in principle had already been reached, or nearly so, in regard to the elimination of nuclear weapon delivery vehicles. The Canadian representative, Mr. Burns, with whom other Western representatives associated themselves, enumerated a number of agreements "in principle". He said:

"It is agreed that the reduction and final elimination of nuclear weapon vehicles is the most important and probably the most difficult sector of the disarmament process. It is agreed that they should all be done away with in the final stage of disarmament." (ENDC/PV.163, p.14)

Mr. Burns also referred to a number of other agreements "in principle".

Following the line taken by the Canadian representative, the United Kingdom representative stated:

"As I have said, we are agreed upon what we want to do. That is, we want to eliminate all nuclear delivery vehicles from the arsenals of States. That is the agreement in principle which has already been established."

(ENDC/PV.165, p.14)

(The Chairman, USSR)

Neither Mr. Burns nor Sir Paul Mason, however, was talking about this specific Soviet proposal to eliminate all nuclear weapon delivery vehicles during the first stage of the disarmament process and to retain the "nuclear umbrella" until the end of the third stage, but about other principles of a general nature which were discussed considerably earlier. Now we have before us another specific task: that of agreeing on the fundamental aspects of the proposal to eliminate all nuclear weapon delivery vehicles in the first stage of disarmament, and to retain the "nuclear umbrella" until the end of disarmament. In this respect, references to certain past agreements in principle can hardly be of much help.

There is yet another point which cannot but cause us concern. In their polemics with us, the Western representatives try to misinterpret the position of the Soviet Union and the principle of its approach to the solution of the problem of general and complete disarmament. The United Kingdom representative tried here to make out that we were in agreement with the Western approach to disarmament, which as we know, is based on the expectation of retaining the possibility of unleashing a nuclear war until the very end of the last stage of disarmament. But this approach has nothing in common with our approach to the solution of the disarmament problem, nor has it anything in common with the Soviet Government's proposal for a "nuclear umbrella". The United Kingdom representative asserted that, under the Soviet proposal for a "nuclear umbrella",

"... the possibility of nuclear war will also exist ... until the end of the third stage". (ibid., p.17)

I must say that such an evaluation of our proposal does not correspond to its real content.

It is common knowledge that the Soviet Government takes the stand that measures leading to a considerable lessening of the threat of a nuclear war can and must be taken at the very beginning of disarmament. This prerequisite underlies the Soviet draft treaty on general and complete disarmament, and our proposal for a "nuclear umbrella" is also based upon it. The Soviet Government is seeking for ways and means of reaching such an agreement as would save the peoples from a nuclear war as quickly as possible.

(The Chairman, USSR)

The very line of reasoning of the United Kingdom representative cannot but cause surprise. In our proposal for a "nuclear umbrella" he tried to see a reflection of the concepts of the Western strategists of NATO, who are constantly calling for the intensification of the armaments race, particularly in the field of nuclear weapons, concepts which are absolutely alien to our proposal, both in their spirit and in their consequences. Frankly, we were surprised to hear the United Kingdom representative urging us to study the question of the damage from a nuclear blow that would be "acceptable" or "unacceptable" to any particular country (ibid., p.16). That may be a suitable subject for study in the NATO staffs, but it is not a suitable one for our Committee, which has been entrusted with the task of ensuring the disarmament of States. Our task is to eliminate altogether any possibility of dealing any nuclear blows.

I should not have felt obliged to dwell on this part of the statement of the United Kingdom representative if what he said had not shed a clear light on what used to be an what apparently still is the basic position of the Western Powers. In analyzing the attitude of the United Kingdom in regard to the Soviet Union proposal for a "nuclear umbrella", one cannot fail to see that it is based, not on expectations of disarmament, but on expectations of a speeding-up by the United Kingdom of the race in the field of nuclear and other armaments. In confirmation of this I shall take the liberty of referring to a White Paper published in the United Kingdom on 13 February 1964, just a few days ago, containing a Government statement on defence for 1964. This official document of the United Kingdom Government clearly shows the following: first, despite a certain lessening of international tension, which has been admitted on a number of occasions by those who direct the foreign policy of the United Kingdom, and despite the example shown to the world by the Soviet Union and the United States, which have taken the course of reducing military expenditure, the Government of the United Kingdom is increasing its military budget. Secondly, the United Kingdom Government is intensifying the race in the field of nuclear armaments. Thirdly, the Government of the United Kingdom is also intensifying the race in the field of conventional armaments and armed forces. That is the present policy of the Government of the United Kingdom. That is the real reason which explains the United Kingdom's negative position in the negotiations on disarmament. We can only express deep regret at such a course in the policy of the United Kingdom.

(The Chairman, USSR)

The United States representative, Mr. Foster, based his whole defence of the United States approach on the assertion that the percentage reduction in strategic armaments which the United States and its NATO allies propose would make it possible to maintain the balance of forces throughout the disarmament process and would thus ensure the security of States.

Let us see, however, what the so-called percentage reduction of nuclear weapon delivery vehicles, which is defended by the Western Powers, would look like in reality. Let us examine this proposal on the basis of a concrete example. According to the United States newspaper The New York Times, by 31 December last year 534 intercontinental missiles in operational readiness were located at launching pads in the territory of the United States. According to other available data, such as those quoted in "Military Balance 1963-1964", a publication of the Institute for Strategic Studies, 500 more intercontinental missiles of the Minuteman category will be added to these missiles by the middle of 1965. Thus, according to these data, by the middle of 1965 the United States will have over 1,000 of these missiles, while according to a statement by Mr. McNamara, Secretary of State for Defense of the United States, there will be over 1,700 such missiles by 1966.

If one takes into consideration the oft-repeated remarks of the Western representatives that it will take many more years to elaborate a treaty on general and complete disarmament, it must be assumed that in their opinion the middle of 1965 is too near a date to allow of the possibility of a start being made by that time on the actual implementation of general and complete disarmament. But even if we assume that disarmament will begin by that time, in that case also by the time of the second stage of disarmament the United States, under its proposal for a percentage reduction of nuclear weapon delivery vehicles, would still have more than 700 intercontinental ballistic missiles — that is to say, many more than the United States has now, in 1964. Moreover, at the third stage of disarmament, if we start out from these data alone, the United States would have at its disposal at least 350 missiles (I am referring to intercontinental missiles). Presumably, the missiles retained would be of the most advanced types, such as Minuteman, or something like that. This means that by the time of the third stage of disarmament the United States, under its disarmament programme, would have at its disposal more Minuteman missiles than it has now.

(The Chairman, USSR)

What kind of disarmament is this? If this is to be regarded as disarmament, then it should be admitted that we are already living in an almost disarmed world according to the Western fashion, and that we have, so to speak, already approached the third and final stage of disarmament as it is envisaged in the minds of the Western representatives.

Yet it is well known that the world has already accumulated so many nuclear weapons and the means of their delivery that the United States military term "overkill" has been coined; in Russian we talk about multiple destruction capacity. It is this multiple capacity of destroying each other that the Western representatives are seeking to retain virtually until the very end of disarmament, by insisting on a percentage reduction of nuclear weapon delivery vehicles. Yet attempts are made to convince us that this is the most reasonable, the safest or, as Mr. Foster has said, the most orderly and balanced way of bringing about general and complete disarmament.

If we analyze carefully the approach of the United States to the implementation of measures in the field of nuclear weapon delivery vehicles, we see that it is by no means such an approach of principle, as Mr. Foster tried to represent it. Here is an example. Quite recently the United States submitted to the Committee a proposal for the freezing of strategic means of delivery of nuclear weapons (ENDC/120). As you see, this proposal does not concern all means of delivery, but only strategic ones. Thus the United States considers it possible to single out a certain type of weapon and to freeze it at the present level, while retaining the possibility of accumulating and improving all other types of weapons -- say, tactical means of delivery of nuclear weapons. If we approach the question with the yardstick which Mr. Foster used at the meeting of 11 February, the freezing of strategic means of delivery only, which he proposes, is bound to upset the balance; yet we have heard here something quite different. In this respect, Mr. Foster, you are inconsistent.

Moreover, the United States is not following the principle of percentage reduction even where its own plan for general and complete disarmament is concerned.

(The Chairman, USSR)

Everyone who is familiar with that document and has heard the explanations given by the United States delegation in the course of our past work knows very well that, first, in its plan the United States does not at all provide for the elimination of the nuclear weapons themselves until the conclusion of the third and final stage of disarmament, but limits itself in the first and second stages of disarmament merely to partial measures concerning not nuclear weapons, but stockpiles of fissile materials or their future production. And if we take the question of reducing armed forces, does the United States propose a percentage approach to this? No, it does not. It insists on establishing definite, fixed levels, and, as we know, rather high levels.

We have opposed and continue to oppose the percentage approach to the elimination of nuclear weapon delivery vehicles precisely because such an approach does not eliminate the danger of a nuclear war. That is the gist of the differences of principle between ourselves and the Western Powers. Our proposal is aimed at saving the peoples from the threat of a thermonuclear war in the very first stage of disarmament, and we see the meaning of disarmament in that alone and in nothing else. We are against retaining the danger throughout the disarmament process, because that would be fundamentally contrary to the very idea of general and complete disarmament.

For all its goodwill the Soviet delegation, in studying the statements of the Western representatives, cannot but arrive at a disheartening conclusion. If we are to call a spade a spade, what the Western Powers want from us is not explanations but in fact the adoption of their Western approach to disarmament. They want us to agree to a percentage reduction of nuclear weapon delivery vehicles, the meaning and consequences of which I have just explained. Any appeals to turn to a technical study and to become involved in a discussion of details merely serve as a means of evading an answer to the question which has been put before the Western delegations in regard to the measures proposed by us for a radical lessening of the threat of a nuclear war, beginning with the first stage of disarmament. People are waiting for all of us to take the first urgent step: namely, to come to an agreement in principle on the Soviet proposal. The achievement of such an agreement is a natural and inevitable requirement for any serious negotiations, if the parties really wish to agree.

(The Chairman, USSR)

Our Western colleagues also understand this aspect of the matter perfectly well. At the meeting of 4 February the Canadian representative, Mr. Burns, declared:

"We are all aware that 'agreement in principle' is usually one of the stages in any negotiation". (ENDC/PV.163, p.13)

We have now come to such a stage in our negotiations, when, for the progress of the negotiations on general and complete disarmament, it is essential to have a direct and clear answer from the Western delegations to the proposal of the Soviet Union to retain the "nuclear umbrella" until the end of the third stage of disarmament.

During the discussions in the Committee, many of its members have repeatedly stressed that the question of eliminating nuclear weapon delivery vehicles is the central one in the whole disarmament programme and that, in practice, the solution of other key questions depends on the way in which it is solved. At the same time, this means that any delay in reaching agreement on the Soviet proposal for the "nuclear umbrella" may adversely affect all the activities of the Committee and particularly its main task — general and complete disarmament.

We trust that the statement made by the United States representative, Mr. Foster, at our meeting on 11 February (ENDC/PV.165, pp.19 et seq.) is not final and that it does not reflect the true position of the United States Government on this question.

The Soviet delegation appeals to the delegations of the United States and its Western allies to reach agreement in regard to nuclear weapon delivery vehicles on the basis of the proposal of the Soviet Union: that is, to reach agreement on the destruction of all nuclear weapon delivery vehicles in the first stage of disarmament and on the retention by the Soviet Union and the United States of a small, strictly limited number of missiles of specified types and categories until the end of the third stage of disarmament. Such a solution of the question would correspond with the requirements of peace and security and would facilitate further progress in the cause of disarmament.

The Conference decided to issue the following communiqué:

"The Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament today held its 167th plenary meeting in the Palais des Nations, Geneva, under the Chairmanship of H.E. Ambassador S.K. Tsarapkin, representative of the Soviet Union.

"Statements were made by the representatives of Canada, Italy, Poland, India and the Soviet Union.

"The next meeting of the Conference will be held on Thursday 20 February 1964 at 10.30 a.m."

The meeting rose at 12.30 p.m.

ENDC/PV.167

4

PRESENTS A LA TABLE DE LA CONFERENCE (suite)

Tchécoslovaquie :

M. M. ZEMLA
M. T. LAHODA
M. J. BUCEK
M. V. VAJNAR

Union des Républiques socialistes
soviétiques :

M. S.K. TSARAPKINE
M. A.A. ROCHTCHINE
M. I.G. OUSSATCHEV
M. I.I. TCHEPROV

Représentant spécial du
Secrétaire général :

M. D. PROTITCH

Représentant spécial adjoint du
Secrétaire général :

M. W. EPSTEIN